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ABSTRACT

A user authentication system for an electronic device for use
with a plurality of wireless wearable medical sensors
(WMSs) and a wireless base station that receives a biomedi
cal data stream (biostream ) from each WMS. The system
includes a BioAura engine located on a server, the server has
a wireless transmitter/receiver with receive buffers that store
the plurality of biostreams, the BioAura engine has a look up
stage and a classifier, the classifier generates an authentica
tion output based on the plurality of biostreams, the authen
tication output authenticates the user's access to the elec
tronic device. The wireless base station has a transmitter /
receiver having receive buffers that store the biomedical data
from each WMS, the wireless base station has a communi
cation engine that retrieves the biostream from each WMS
and transmits the plurality of biostreams to the server .
20 Claims, 10 Drawing Sheets
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CONTINUOUS AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM
AND METHOD BASED ON BIOAURA

wearable medical sensors (WMSs) and a wireless base
station configured to receive a biomedical data stream
(biostream ) from each of the plurality of WMSs . The system
includes a BioAura engine located on a server, the server

CROSS - REFERENCE TO PRIOR FILED

APPLICATIONS

5 being configured with a wireless transmitter/receiver having
buffers configured to store the plurality of bio
This application claims priority to U.S. provisional appli receive
streams, the biostream from a single WMS lacking the
cation 62/291,877 , filed Feb. 5 , 2016 , which is incorporated discriminatory power to distinguish the user, the BioAura
herein in its entirety .
engine having a look up stage and a classifier , the classifier
10 being configured to generate an authentication output based
STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY
on the plurality of biostreams, the authentication output
SPONSORED RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT
being configured to authenticate the user's access to the
This invention was made with government support under electronic device . The wireless base station is configured
Grant CNS - 1219570 awarded by the National Science Foun with a wireless transmitter/receiver having receive buffers

dation . The government has certain rights in the invention . 15 wireless
configuredbaseto store
the biomedical data from each WMS, the
station having a communication engine con

figured to retrieve the biostream from each WMS and
transmit the plurality of biostreams to the server.
The present disclosure generally relates to the field of
The plurality of biostreams may be selected from the
authentication systems and in more particular, authentica- 20 following biostreams: Arterial systolic blood pressure
(ABPSYS ), Arterial diastolic blood pressure (ABPDIAS),
tion systems based on biomedical data streams.
Arterial average blood pressure (ABPMEAN ), Heart rate
(HR ), Pulmonary systolic artery pressure (PAPSYS ), Pul
BACKGROUND
monary diastolic artery pressure (PAPDIAS), Body tem
Authentication refers to the process of verifying a user 25 perature ( T),Oxygen saturation (SPO2) and Respiratory rate
based on certain credentials, before granting access to a (RESP ). The plurality of biostreams may include at least
secure system , resource, or area . Vulnerabilities in an three of the following biostreams: Arterial systolic blood
authentication system may be exploited by adversaries, pressure (ABPSYS ), Arterial diastolic blood pressure (ABP
leading to leakage of confidential data (e.g., encryption DIAS), Arterial average blood pressure (ABPMEAN ), Heart
keys), compromised integrity, and loss ofprivacy. The need 30 rate (HR ), Pulmonary systolic artery pressure (PAPSYS ),
for an authentication mechanism is not limited to logging in Pulmonary diastolic artery pressure (PAPDIAS ), Body tem
to computers. It is also needed to protect restricted physical perature ( T ), Oxygen saturation (SPO2) and Respiratory rate
spaces (e.g., datacenters) and secure software (e.g., e -com
(RESP ). The plurality of biostreams may include the fol
merce ) applications.
lowing biostreams: Arterial systolic blood pressure (ABP
Traditionally, authentication is only performed when the 35 SYS),Arterial diastolic blood pressure (ABPDIAS), Arterial
user initially interacts with the system . In these scenarios, average blood pressure (ABPMEAN ), Heart rate (HR ),
the user faces a knowledge -based authentication challenge Pulmonary systolic artery pressure (PAPSYS), Pulmonary
(e.g., a password inquiry ), and the user is authenticated only diastolic artery pressure (PAPDIAS ), Body temperature ( T ),
Oxygen saturation (SPO2) and Respiratory rate (RESP ). It
if he offers the correct answer ( e.g., the password ).
FIELD OF THE INVENTION

Although one -time authentication has been the dominant 40 include
should be4 orunderstood
that the plurality of biostreams may
5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or all 9 of the above disclosed

authentication mechanism for decades, several issues span

ning user inconvenience to security flaws have been inves biostreams depending on the desired target accuracy level.
tigated by researchers. For example, the user has to focus on
The plurality of biostreams may be selected based on a
several authentication steps when he tries to unlock a smart target accuracy level . The Bio Aura engine may be operated
phone,which utilizes a password/pattern -based authentica- 45 continuously, generating the authentication output on a
tion method . This may lead to safety risks ( e.g., distraction periodic or a-periodic basis. The communication engine may
when the user is driving ). A serious security flaw of one- time be configured to process the biostreams to reduce the
authentication is its inability to detect intruders after initial bandwidth needed to transmit the biostream to the BioAura
authentication has been performed . For example, an unau
engine. The base station may be a smartphone . The elec
thorized user can access private resources of the initial user 50 tronic device may be at least one of a tablet and a smart lock .
if he leaves his authenticated device to take a break , or The classifier may be implemented using Support one of
Vector Machine (SVM ) and Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost).
forgets to log out.
The above concerns have led to investigations of continu

A user authentication system for a computing device is

ous authentication mechanisms, which frequently monitor also disclosed . The system is used with a plurality of
the user's interactions with the device even after the initial 55 wireless wearable medical sensors (WMSs ) and a wireless
login to ensure that the initially -authenticated user is still the
one using the device . Initial efforts in this direction were

base station configured to receive a biomedical data stream
(biostream ) from each of the plurality of WMSs. The system

A user authentication system for an electronic device is
disclosed . The system is used with a plurality of wireless

65 authentication output based on the plurality of biostreams,
the authentication output being configured to authenticate
the user's access to the computing device . The wireless base

based on simple security policies that lock the user's device includes a Bio Aura engine located on the computing device,
after a period of inactivity , and ask the user to re-enter the the computing device being configured with a wireless
password. However, such schemes may be annoying and 60 transmitter /receiver having receive buffers configured to
expose a window of vulnerability, leaving much room for store the plurality of biostreams, the biostream from a single
improvement
WMS lacking the discriminatory power to distinguish the
user, the BioAura engine having a look up stage and a
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
classifier, the classifier being configured to generate an

US 10,652,237 B2
3

4

station is configured with a wireless transmitter/receiver a wireless transmitter/receiver having receive buffers con
having receive buffers configured to store the biomedical figured to store the plurality of biostreams, the biostream
data from each WMS , the wireless base station having a from a single WMS lacking the discriminatory power to
communication engine configured to retrieve the biostream distinguish the user, the BioAura engine having a look up
from each WMS and transmit the plurality of biostreams to ui stage and a classifier, the classifier being configured to
the computing device .
generate an authentication output based on the plurality of
The plurality of biostreams may be selected from the biostreams, the authentication output being configured to
following biostreams: Arterial systolic blood pressure authenticate the user's access to the computing device. The
(ABPSYS), Arterial diastolic blood pressure ( ABPDIAS), wireless base station is configured with a wireless transmit
Arterial average blood pressure (ABPMEAN ), Heart rate 10 ter/receiver having receive buffers configured to store the
(HR ), Pulmonary systolic artery pressure (PAPSYS), Pul biomedical data from each WMS, the wireless base station
monary diastolic artery pressure (PAPDIAS), Body tem
having a communication engine configured to retrieve the
perature ( T ), Oxygen saturation (SPO2) and Respiratory rate biostream from each WMS and transmit the plurality of
(RESP ). The plurality of biostreams may include at least biostreams to the computing device .
three of the following biostreams: Arterial systolic blood 15
pressure (ABPSYS ), Arterial diastolic blood pressure (ABP
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES
DIAS), Arterial average blood pressure (ABPMEAN ), Heart
rate (HR ), Pulmonary systolic artery pressure (PAPSYS ),
FIG . 1 is a block diagram with “ design -octagon ” includ
Pulmonary diastolic artery pressure (PAPDIAS), Body tem
ing eight design requirements that a continuous authentica
perature ( T ), Oxygen saturation (SPO2) and Respiratory rate 20 tion mechanism must satisfy ;
(RESP ). The plurality of biostreams may include the fol
FIG . 2 is a block diagram of a CABA system ;
lowing biostreams: Arterial systolic blood pressure (ABP
FIG . 3 is a block diagram of a CABA system configured
SYS ), Arterial diastolic blood pressure (ABPDIAS ), Arterial for authentication of a tablet;
average blood pressure (ABPMEAN ), Heart rate (HR ),
FIG . 4 is a block diagram of a CABA system configured
Pulmonary systolic artery pressure (PAPSYS), Pulmonary 25 for authentication of a personal computer;
diastolic artery pressure (PAPDIAS), Body temperature ( T ),
FIG . 5 is a block diagram that illustrates how the CABA
Oxygen saturation (SPO2) and Respiratory rate (RESP ). It system works when the user requests authentication ;
should be understood that the plurality of biostreams may
FIG . 6 shows two possible output sequences over a
include 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or all 9 of the above disclosed

ten -minute authentication timeframe when an impostor is

The plurality of biostreamsmay be selected based on a
target accuracy level. The communication engine may be
configured to process the biostreams to reduce the band
width needed to transmit the biostream to the computing

FIG . 7 shows the average EER , for different classifiers
with respect to TRW ;
FIG . 8 shows moving training windows;
FIG . 9 is a graph showing how EER77n changes when we

biostreams depending on the desired target accuracy level . 30 trying to get authenticated ;

device . The computing device may be a personal computer. 35 drop different Biostreams; and
The BioAura engine may be operated continuously, gener
FIG . 10 is a block diagram showing how a CABA system

ating the authentication output on a periodic or a -periodic can identify a user .
basis . The classifier may be implemented using Support one
To facilitate understanding , identical reference numerals
of Vector Machine (SVM ) and Adaptive Boosting (Ada
have been used , where possible, to designate identical
Boost).
40 elements that are common to the figures.
A method of authenticating a user authentication of an
electronic device is disclosed . The method is used with a
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
plurality ofwireless wearable medical sensors (WMSs ) and
a wireless base station configured to receive a biomedical
Recently , wearable medical sensors (WMSs ) have drawn
data stream (biostream ) from each of the plurality of WMSs. 45 a lot of attention from the research community. WMSs
Themethod includes providing a Bio Aura engine located on measure physiological data (e.g. , heart rate, blood pressure,
a server, the server being configured with a wireless trans and body temperature ). A recent report by Business Insider

mitter/receiver having receive buffers configured to store the
plurality of biostreams, the biostream from a single WMS
lacking the discriminatory power to distinguish the user, the 50
Bio Aura engine having a look up stage and a classifier, the
classifier being configured to generate an authentication

claims that 33 million wearable health monitoring devices
reach 148 million by 2019. In the years after that, such usage
is expected to explode further . If such physiological data will
be collected anyway for health monitoring purposes, it is
have been sold in 2015. It forecasts that this number will

output based on the plurality of biostreams, the authentica worthwhile to investigate if they also have authentication
tion outputbeing configured to authenticate the user's access value . The use of continuously -collected biomedical data for
to the electronic device . The wireless base station is con- 55 user verification and identification is promising for three
figured with a wireless transmitter/receiver having receive main reasons. First, data collection does not require any
buffers configured to store the biomedical data from each extra device not already on the body. Second , the data is
WMS, the wireless base station having a communication collected transparently to the user. Third , unlike traditional
engine configured to retrieve the biostream from each WMS biometrics/behaviometrics (e.g., face feature and keyboard
and transmit the plurality of biostreams to the server.
60 pattern ) information that may frequently become unavail
A method of authenticating a user of a computing device able , the stream of biomedical data can be assumed to be
is also disclosed . The method is used with a plurality of always available when the person is wearing WMSs.
wireless wearable medical sensors (WMSs) and a wireless
Disclosed herein is a system for Continuous Authentica
base station configured to receive a biomedical data stream
tion Based on BioAura (CABA ). A novel continuous authen
(biostream ) from each of the plurality ofWMSs. The method 65 tication system that is inspired by and leverages the emer
includes providing a Bio Aura engine located on the com
gence of sensors for pervasive and continuous health
puting device , the computing device being configured with monitoring. In this disclosure the term BioAura refers to an

US 10,652,237 B2
5

ensemble of biomedical data streams that can be collected

6

4. Scalability : The system should be able to handle a

continuously and non - invasively using wearable medical growing amount of work when the number of users
devices . Each biomedical data stream in isolation may not be increases . In particular, its time and space complexity should
highly discriminative . It is demonstrated herein that a col increase modestly with an increase in the number of users .
lection of such biomedical data , along with robust machine 5 5. Efficiency : A short response time (i.e., the time required
learning , can provide high accuracy levels. The feasibility of to capture a test sample , process it , and provide a decision )
CABA is demonstrated through analysis of traces from the is very desirable from both user convenience and security
MIMIC - II dataset. Various applications of CABA are also perspectives. While it is obviously desirable for the system
disclosed herein . The system may be extended to user to quickly authenticate a legitimate user and reject an
identification and adaptive access control authorization . 10 impostor
may also suffer if there is an appreciable
Possible threats to the CABA system and suggested coun delay. For, security
example
, if authorization takes five minutes, an
termeasures are also disclosed .
impostor
may
be
able to control the system and access
The CABA system is a novel transparent continuous
authentication system based on a new class of traits called restricted resources in that five -minute timeframe, while the
“ BioAura.” The term “ aura” is traditionally defined as the 15 system
is still processing.
6. Low cost: Cost is another important factor in authen
energy field around a person . Analogously , the term “ Bio
Aura ” as used herein defines the biological field around a tication systems used in low - security environments (e.g., in
person , manifested as a set of biomedical data streams personal computers). In such environments, the cost of
( Biostreams in short). A Biostream is defined as a sequence adding or modifying the authentication mechanism should
of biomedical data samples that are continuously gathered 20 ideally be negligible . Thus, mechanisms that do not need
by a WMS for medical diagnosis and therapeutic purposes . extra peripherals (e.g., retina scanners ) would be generally
The most important difference between a Biostream and a preferred . However, for high -security environments ( e.g.,
biometric trait is that a single Biostream alone does not have military bases ), expensive authentication mechanisms could
enough discriminatory power to distinguish individuals . be deployed.
Thus, an authentication decision based on a single Bio- 25 7. Stability : Any trait that is recorded for processing for
stream ( e.g.,body temperature or blood pressure ) might only authentication purposes must ideally have only slight
be slightly discriminative . However, when multiple Bio changes or maintain its pattern over a certain time period .
streams
are combined into a BioAura, it leads to a powerful
8. Extensibility : The authentication system should be able
continuous authentication scheme. Disclosed herein is a
to function on a wide variety of devices regardless of
comprehensive list of criteria that should be satisfied by 30 underlying hardware. Ideally, the system should not require
authentication mechanisms. Also disclosed herein is an dedicated hardware . Its design should take a large set of
analysis of how the CABA system meets all these require applications into consideration . It should be extensible to
ments, whereas biometrics /behaviometrics -based continu
different environments with a minimum level of effort.
ous authentication mechanisms do not.
Advantages of the CABA System
Desirable authentication requirements and advantages of 35 In this subsection , the CABA system is compared to
CABA
previously -proposed schemes (biometrics- and behaviomet
A systematic comparison between CABA and previously rics-based ). Table I highlights the significant advantages of
proposed continuous authentication system is disclosed . A the CABA system and describes how it addresses the
list of desirable requirements that an authentication mecha different requirements of the Design -octagon . Table II com
nism must satisfy is provided . Then , the CABA system is 40 pares the CABA system to continuous biometrics- and
compared with biometrics- and behaviometrics -based con behaviometrics -based authentication mechanisms. Although
tinuous authentication mechanisms based on these require
a detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
ments .
previously
-proposed schemes is beyond the scope of this
Design -Octagon
disclosure paper, several scientific and engineering publica
Currently, there is no standard list of design requirements 45 tions in the area of authentication were reviewed . The
that a continuous authentication mechanism must satisfy . summarized advantages and weaknesses of biometrics- and
FIG . 1 is a block diagram with “ design -octagon” including behaviometrics -based mechanisms are shown in Table II.
eight design requirements that a continuous authentication
mechanism must satisfy . The individual design requirements
TABLE I
50
are discussed in detail below .
Characteristics of the CABA system
1. Passiveness : A user- friendly system must not require
frequent user involvement. For example , if the authentica
Requirement
Description
tion mechanism asks the user to re -enter his credentials too
Passiveness
Ensured by using WMSs that minimize
often , it may be quite annoying to the user.
user's involvement.
2. Availability : The system should provide a reliable 55 Availability
Achieved by using continuously
authentication mechanism at all time instances . Lack of

continuous availability is a significant drawback of several
previously - proposed continuous authentication mecha
nisms— they may often fail due to a lack of sufficient
information. For instance, a face recognition system , which 60
fails to capture the user's face when he is moving, may
unintentionally reject a legitimate user .
3. High accuracy : One of the most important requirement
of every authentication system is high accuracy . The system

should be able to confidently and accurately distinguish 65
legitimate users from impostors, and reject impostors '
requests .

Accuracy

Scalability

Efficiency

monitored Biostreams.
Demonstrated below .

As shown below , an increase in the

number of users can be easily handled
in this system .
Authentication can be done in a few

milliseconds as discussed below .
Low cost

Stability

Use of already -deployed WMSs ensures
that added cost is minimal.
High accuracy over different
timeframes demonstrates that the
collected data maintain their pattern
over time.
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Low -security environment: Continuous authentication
may not be required in a low - security environment

TABLE I - continued
Characteristics of the CABA system

Requirement

Description

Extensibility

Unlike many biometric- and

(e.g., a common room in an apartment).

Intentionally -shared resources: A user might want to
intentionally authorize a group of users to access some

5

specific locations or resources . For example , consider a
access to him when he approaches the door of his
house . Hemay want to open the door for his guests and

behaviometric -based schemes, CABA
does not rely on authentication -specific

user who uses a lock automation system , which grants

components .

leave the house to go shopping . A continuous authen

TABLE II

Comparison of different continuous authentication
mechanisms
Low

Mechanism

Passiveness

Biometrics -based
Behaviometrics

+

based
CABA

+

Availability Accuracy Scalability Efficiency cost Stability Extensibility
+
+
+

+

+
+

+

+
+
+

Since several of the previously -proposed methods fail to
address passiveness, availability, and extensibility , we next 25
elaborate how the CABA system ensures all of these .
Passiveness : In the CABA system , passiveness is
addressed through the use of WMSs. These are small
and compact sensors that are specifically designed to
take the passiveness requirement into account, since 30

+
+

+

+
+

+

tication system that requires the presence of the tar
geted person may be bothersome in this scenario .
Generally , a continuous authentication mechanism that
has high accuracy and a short response time may be able to
provide stand -alone one- time authentication or complement
a traditional authentication mechanism (whose decision is
only considered at the time of initial login ). The CABA

continuous health monitoring needs to minimize user system can provide an accurate decision within a few
involvement. Thus, passiveness is not only a very milliseconds and, hence , is also useful in situations where
desirable requirement for continuous authentication , one -time authentication is preferred .
but also a significant consideration in designing WMSs .
Design Considerations
Unfortunately, major biometrics-based mechanisms 35 In order to describe how the CABA system functions, we
(e.g., fingerprint-based ) do not provide a high level of first need to answer three fundamental design and imple
passiveness .
mentation questions:

Availability : Use of WMSs as capture devices also
ensures a continuous stream of information since this is

also required for continuous health monitoring . How- 40

1. How can the Biostreams that constitute the Bio Aura be
collected ?

2. How can the collected Biostreams be transmitted to the

ever, neither biometrics nor behaviometrics guarantees authentication system ?
availability . For example, keyboard/mouse-based con
3. Which Biostreams constitute the BioAura ?
tinuous authentication mechanisms fail when the user
The in -depth answers to each question are set out below .
Data Collection
stops using the dedicated peripherals .
Extensibility: the CABA system can be implemented with 45 Each Biostream is continuously and noninvasively cap
a general-purpose computing unit, which collects the tured by a corresponding WMS. The use of WMSs in
Biostreams, with sufficient memory capacity and com
conjunction with mobile devices like smartphones is revo

putation power. Unfortunately, neither biometrics- nor
behaviometrics-based mechanisms provide significant

lutionizing healthcare systems by offering the possibility of
inexpensive continuous health monitoring. The most

nience .

tion of the biomedical data . It should be understood that

extensibility . For example, the nature of keyboard / 50
mouse -based authentication schemes inherently limits
their applications, i.e., they can only be used for
implementing an authentication mechanism in a system
that has a keyboard or a mouse .
The CABA system can also be used as a stand -alone 55
one -time authentication system or as a complement to a
knowledge-based authentication mechanism that provides
one- time authentication . Although continuous authentica
tion methods have begun to deal with several concerns ( e.g.,
the possibility of stolen or forgotten passwords), traditional 60
mechanisms still dominate current technologies, and in
some scenarios, they may be intentionally preferred . Several

widely -used scheme for continuous health monitoring con
sists of two main classes of components : (i) WMSs and ( ii )
a base station . The base station may range from smart
phones to specialized wireless computing devices, known as
health hubs. All WMSs transmit their data to the base station
either for further processing or long -term storage . In recent
years , smart phones have become the dominantbase station
since they are powerful and ubiquitous . FIG . 2 is a block
diagram of a CABA system 20. This example is a simple
continuous health monitoring system that includes several
small lightweight WMSs 26a-26d , which transmit their
biomedical data to the base station 22, e.g., a smart phone.
Communications of data from the WMSs to the base station
such scenarios are discussed below .
is typically accomplished via a wireless communication
Battery -powered devices: Incurring overheadsof continu technique. In the examples below base station and back end
ous authentication on a battery -powered device may 65 servers are configured with Bluetooth transmitter/receivers
drain its battery quickly, and lead to user inconve
( Bluetooth communication link ) for wireless communica
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three Biostreams from the proposed BioAura, and include
the other nine. Next, we discuss why the three Biostreams

9
other wireless communication techniques may be used with
out departing from the scope of this disclosure. It should also

be understood that the base station 22 includes at least one

are excluded .

processor 24. The base station 22 also a wireless receiver,
e.g., Bluetooth , with one more receive buffers 28 and from 5

TABLE III

which the biomedical data is retrieved after it is received
from the various WMSs . The base station 22 also includes

Biostreams, their abbreviations /notations, and units

a communication engine (as shown my block 28 ) configured

Biostream

to retrieve the biomedical data from the receive buffers . The 10 Electroencephalogram
communication engine may forward the biomedical data to Electrocardiogram
the BioAura Engine 30 for processing of the biomedical data Blood glucose
Arterial systolic blood pressure
collected from the WMSs. In the alternative the communi
diastolic blood pressure
cation engine may perform some signal processing on the Arterial
Arterial average blood pressure

biomedical data or simply re- transmit the raw biomedical
data to a more powerful back -end server 32. The back -end
server 32 is configured with a wireless receiver , e.g., Blu
etooth , with one or more receive buffers to store the bio
medical data and a BioAura Engine 30 for processing the
biomedical data retrieved from the receive buffers .

15

Electrocardiogram
Heart rate

Pulmonary systolic artery pressure
Pulmonary diastolic artery pressure

Body temperature

20

Oxygen saturation
Respiratory rate

Abbreviations /Notations

Unit

EEG

?V
?V
mg/dL
MmHg
MmHg

ECG
BG

ABPSYS
ABPDIAS
ABPMEAN
HR
PAPSYS
PAPDIAS
T
SPO2
RESP
ECG

MmHg
1 /min

mmHg
mmHg
Celsius
%
1 /min

?V

Data Transmission

In a prototype implementation , it is assumed that the
1. Electroencephalogram (EEG ): EEG is not included in
biomedical data is collected from the WMSs by a smart
the BioAura because it cannot be conveniently captured at
phone ( e.g., base station 22) and transmitted to the authen
this time. The currentmethod for capturing EEG requires the
tication system (e.g.,back end server 30 ) by the smartphone . 25 user to wear a cap . Moreover, its capture devices cannot be
This assumption is made for three main reasons. First, as miniaturized further because electrodes need to form a
mentioned earlier, recent technological advances have made minimum diameter to be noise -robust. It should be under
the smartphone a promising candidate for use as a base stood that this biostream could be included once suitable
station in continuous health monitoring. Second , its energy detection mechanisms become available .
capacity is less limited relative to WMSs and the required 30 2. Electrocardiogram ( ECG ): We have excluded ECG
biomedical data can be collected from the WMSs with a

negligible energy overhead in the smartphone . Third , a
smartphone can support secure communication links that
can prevent several potential attacks against the system .
Smartphones can be integrated into the CABA system in 35
two different ways : (i) they can simply retransmit the raw
data, or ( ii ) they can perform simple preprocessing and only
extract values of some important features from the data, and
transmit those values. Each of these approaches has its own
advantages. In the first approach , the back -end server can 40
perform sophisticated feature extraction from the raw data
before incorporating them in a model. This provides more
flexibility in feature extraction . In the second approach , the

amount of data can be minimized or reduced prior to
transmission. This reduces the power consumed in data 45
transmission . In one embodiment we assume that the smart
phone first performs a very simple feature extraction func
tion that computes the average value of the samples in each
Biostream over the last one -minute timeframe of data .
Afterwards, the base station or smartphone transmits only a 50
feature vector that contains these average values. It should
be understood that the various Biostreamsmay be processed
in a variety of ways to reduce the transmission bandwidth
required . It should also be understood that the Biostream
data may be transmitted to /from the base station periodically 55
or a -periodically with a wide variety of intervals between
individual transmissions .
Bio Aura

The next section addresses which Biostreams constitute

the BioAura. From a continuous health monitoring perspec- 60
tive , the WMSs that produce the Biostreams must satisfy

tworequirements : (i) they must need minimum user involve
ment, and ( ii ) the biomedical signals gathered by them
should be essential for routine health monitoring .
Table III shows the most commonly - used Biostreams, 65
their abbreviations or notations used in the medical litera
ture, and their units . In this disclosure we exclude the first

from the list of our Biostreams because the feature extrac

tion mechanism required for it is much more compute
intensive on a smartphone relative to the simple feature
extraction mechanism that we employ for the nine chosen
Biostreams. This would drain the smartphone battery faster.
For example , even performing a low -complexity feature
extraction on one minute of ECG signals requires at least
400x more operations than performing a simple statistical
feature extraction , e.g., averaging, on the respiratory rate
values [ECGC ]. If we try to avoid the preprocessing (i.e.,
feature extraction ) on the smartphone and just transmit the
ECG signals to the authentication system , this would also
entail significant energy consumption since ECG waveforms

contain at least 200 samples/s.
3. Blood glucose (BG ): BG is excluded because currently
the devices that measure BG require active user involvement
( i.e., the user provides one drop of blood ). It should be
understood that this biostream could be included once
suitable , e.g., non - invasive, detection mechanisms become
available.
In this example nine Biostreams are used to form the
Bio Aura in the prototype implementation . It should be
understood that the CABA system need not necessarily be
limited to these nine . As other compact WMSs become
available in the future , they could also be made part of the
BioAura . Note that, unlike biometrics, we do not expect any
one Biostream to have high discriminatory power. High
discriminatory power arises only through an ensemble of
Biostreams, i.e., the BioAura , as we will see later.

Scope of Applications
In this section , we describe the possible applications of

CABA . The concept of continuous authentication based on
Bio Aura can potentially be used to protect (i) personal
computing devices and servers, ( ii ) software applications ,
and (iii ) restricted areas. Next, we conceptually describe

how CABA can be implemented and utilized to protect each
domain .
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preprocessed frame of data points from his BioAura ) to the
Personal Computing Devices and Servers
There is a need to protect computing devices (e.g., per BioAura engine 72 on the personal computer 74. The
sonal computers ) and servers against unauthorized access BioAura engine 72 then authenticates the user and sends this
for two main reasons. First, such systems may store sensitive decision to the authentication engine 76.After initial login ,
information (e.g. , personal information , credit card numbers 5 the BioAura engine 72 demands fresh data points at certain
.
and the like). Second , they can be used to access other intervals
Restricted Areas
restricted systems and resources . Computing devices ( e.g.,
personal computers, laptops, tablets, and smart phones) or
Authentication systems are also used to control access to
servers can employ two different approaches to exploit the restricted physical areas (e.g., buildings , rooms, and data
BioAura approach : (i) they can use their own computing 10 centers ). Typically, the electronic access device that controls
resources to implement a stand - alone version of the system , the entrance (e.g., a smart lock ) would not have enough
or ( ii) they can simply use decisionsmade by a portion of the computation power to use a stand - alone version of the
system implemented on a trusted server. Both approaches CABA system . Hence , in such cases , the CABA system can
be implemented on a trusted server , and authentication
are explained in detail below .
15 decisions are determined on the trusted server and then
transmitted to the electronic access device . This case is
Example 1
similar to the one depicted in FIG . 3 with the tablet replaced
FIG . 3 is a block diagram of a CABA system configured by the lock .
for authentication of a tablet 54. The system includes a smart
Prototype Implementation
phone 42 (base station ) and a trusted server 50 (back end 20 The BioAura engine includes a machine learning model
server ). It should be understood that the smart phone 42 and that uses the biomedical data from each ofWMSs to validate
trusted server 50 both include at least one processor. As or identify users. In this section , we describe the learning
disclosed above, biomedical data is collected from the and decision making phases of BioAura engine .
WMSs 44 by the smartphone 42. The smartphone 42 also
Learning Phase
includes a communication engine 46 configured to retrieve 25 In the learning phase , the BioAura engine is given a
the biomedical data from the receive buffers contained in the training dataset. The model is built using a supervised
smart phone. The communication engine 46 may perform
learning approach i.e., a machine learning approach in
some signal processing on the biomedical data or simply which the model is built based on labeled training data
re - transmit the raw biomedical data to the trusted server 50 . points )
The trusted server 50 is configured with receive buffers to 30 Generally, the amount of information needed to build a
store the biomedical data and a BioAura Engine 52 for model varies from one application to another. The number of
processing the biomedical data from the receive buffers in training data points needed was evaluated to examine how
much information should be sent to the BioAura engine to
the trusted server .
Suppose tablet 54 wants to authenticate its user using build a reliable and accurate model . Each data point in the
BioAura . The tablet may be unable to dedicate its limited 35 training set is nine-dimensional (as shown in the lower 9
memory /energy resources to support the whole authentica entries in Table III) and includes the average values of
tion process. In such a scenario , it can use decisions made by successive measurements of a Biostream over a one-minute
the trusted server 50 running the BioAura engine 52. When timeframe. The value of each dimension is represented using
the user tries to unlock the tablet 54 , the authentication half-precision floating -point format that requires two bytes
engine 56 informs communication engine 46 in the user's 40 of storage. Therefore , if the smartphone needs to transmit
smartphone. The communication engine 46 asks the trusted data points extracted over a one -hour period, it only needs
server to open a secure communication channel. The com
to send 1080 bytes of data to the authentication system over
munication engine 46 then sends the information required this period.
for specifying the device that needs to be unlocked ( e.g., the
In order to maintain reliability , the BioAura engine should
tablet ID ) along with the information that needs to be 45 train a new model based on fresh medical data obtained at
processed to authenticate the user (e.g., the user ID and a certain intervals . In other words, the Bio Aura engine should
preprocessed frame of data points from his BioAura ) to the update the model regularly to ensure that the model main
BioAura engine 52 on the trusted server. The trusted server tains accuracy and can distinguish legitimate users from
then authenticates the user and sends this decision to the impostors. The frequency of model update ( i.e., how fre
authentication engine 56 on the tablet 54. After initial login , 50 quently the BioAura engine should repeat the learning
the trusted server 50 demands fresh data points at certain phase ) depends on several factors, such as required accuracy
and learning time. Experimental results indicate that when
intervals .
the BioAura engine re - trains the model every four hours , it
Example 2
achieves the good accuracy and the learning time is only a
55 few minutes. Learning can be done transparently to the user.
FIG . 4 is a block diagram of a CABA system configured In other words , the BioAura engine can re- train the model
for authentication of a personal computer 74. Suppose the while the user continues to be authenticated . For example,
user wants to login to his personal computer 74. In this case , suppose the learning phase takes five minutes each time and
the personal computer 74 has enough computational power is repeated every four hours ( i.e., each model is used for four
and energy capacity to implement a stand -alone version of 60 hours ). The BioAura engine can start re- training to generate
the BioAura engine 72. This case is similar to the one in a new model after 3 hours and 55 minutes, and be ready with
Example 1, except that there is no need for a trusted server. it after four hours have elapsed .
When the user tries to unlock the personal computer 74 ,
Real- Time Decision Making Phase
the authentication engine 76 informs communication engine
In this phase, the BioAura engine makes decisions using
66 in the user's smartphone 62 and establishes a secure 65 the already- trained model. In a continuous authentication
communication channel. The communication engine 66 then
scenario , the BioAura engine should verify the user's iden
sends the information required to authenticate the user (e.g., tity at certain intervals. The frequency of authentication
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depends on several factors , such as the required level of
authentication . In our prototype implementation , we assume
that the BioAura engine re- authenticates the user every

Experimental Setup and Metrics

security and the amount of information required for one

minute based on a given nine-dimensional data point Y that 5

In this section , we first describe the parameters and
dataset used in some experiments. Then , the accuracy and
scalability metrics used to evaluate the proposed authenti
cation
system areParameters
discussed .and Dataset
Experimental
In the next section , the parameters that were set in an
experimental setup are discussed and the dataset is described

contains the average values of the chosen Biostreams over a
specified time interval. When the user approaches the
authentication system and requests authentication, the
Parameters
smartphone performs a simple computation on the already 10 The following five key parameters were used in connec
gathered Biostreams and provides Y. Therefore, unlike most tion with the experimental setup .
previously -proposed continuous authentication systems
Dataset length (L ) : This is the duration of Biostreams
(e.g., keyboard /mouse -based mechanisms) that require the
measurements, i.e., the number of hours of information
we have for each person in our data set. In our
user to wait while they collect authentication information ,
experiments , we used 14 hours of data for each indi
the BioAura engine obtains the required information almost 15
vidual (i.e., L = 14 h ).
instantaneously because the information has already been
Dataset
dimension (n ): This is the number of Biostreams
gathered and stored on the smartphone for the purpose of
that form the BioAura of an individual. In our setup ,we
health monitoring.
have included nine Biostreams for each person ( i.e.,
FIG . 4 is a block diagram that illustrates how the CABA
n = 9).
system 80 works when the user requests authentication . In a 20 Dataset size (N ): This is the number of people in the
single verification attempt:
dataset (N = 37 in our experiments ).
1. The smartphone 82 preprocesses one minute of Bio
Testing window size ( TEW ): This represents the duration
of biomedicalmeasurements (expressed in hours ) for
streams collected from WMSs 84. Then , it transmits the
each individual used to evaluate the accuracy of the
preprocessed information ( Y ) along with user ID to the 25
trained model in the real-time decision making phase .
BioAura Engine 90. The BioAura engine includes a look
stage 92 and a classifier 94.

up

For example, if TEW is 1 hour, it means we have
included 60 data points in our testing set, where each

2. The Look -up stage 92 sends Y to the appropriate stage
of the classifier 94 (Jury stage ) based on the given user ID .

point is a nine-dimensional vector consisting of the

3. The dedicated classifier processes Y and generates a 30

binary decision 96 (accept or reject).
Look -Up Stage

This stage forwards the nine -dimensional vector Y (in this
example ) provided by the smartphone to the appropriate

classifier based on the given user ID . In order to provide a
fast search mechanism to find the appropriate classifier , this
stage can be implemented using a hash table that associates

user IDs with pointers to the classifiers .
Jury Stage

35

average values of successive measurements of the nine
Biostreams over a one -minute timeframe. We vary the
value of TEW in our experiments to evaluate its impact
on the performance of CABA .
Training window size (TRW ): This represents the dura
tion of the biomedical measurements (expressed in
hours ) for each individual that we used for training the
model in the learning phase . We vary TRW our

experiments to study its impact on the model's accu

racy .
Dataset
40

In order to evaluate the accuracy of CABA , we have used

In this example , the Jury stage includes N binary classi
fiers , where N is the number of people who need to be
authenticated . The i-th classifier is trained to only accept the
data point Y that is extracted by the i-th user's smartphone

a freely available multi-parameter dataset, called MIMIC -II.
MIMIC - II has been extensively used in the medical and
biomedical fields. It includes several anonymized high
resolution vital sign trends, waveforms, and sampled bio

consists of the i-th user's data points labeled as “ accept” and

medical records in MIMIC - II that provide values for all of

from the user's BioAura . The training set of the i- th classifier 45 medical signals for many individuals . We chose the 37

the required Biostreams for at least 14 hours .
others' data points labeled as “ reject” .
Accuracy Metrics
Two well-known binary classification methods were used :
, we define five metrics that we used for analyzing
Support Vector Machine (SVM ) and Adaptive Boosting 50 theNext
accuracy
of the proposed authentication system . The first
(AdaBoost). Next, each method is described .
three are traditionally used for evaluating authentication

SVM : The basic concept in an SVM is to find a hyper mechanisms. We define two more to evaluate accuracy in the
plane that separates the n -dimensional data into two context of continuous authentication .
classes. However, since the data points in the dataset
acceptance rate (FAR ): This is the ratio of falsely
are not usually linearly separable , SVMs introduce the 55 False
accepted
unauthorized users to the total number of
concept of kernel trick that projects the points into a
invalid requests made by impostors trying to access the
higher-dimensional space , where they are linearly sepa
system . In the context of continuous authentication , we
rable . When no prior knowledge about the dataset is
use the notation FARTEw to denote FAR under TEW .
available , SVMsusually demonstrate promising results
False
rejection rate (FRR ): This refers to the ratio of
and generalize well .
60
falsely rejected requests to the total number of valid
AdaBoost: The idea behind AdaBoost is to build a highly
requests made by legitimate users trying to access the
accurate classifier by combining many weak classifiers.
system . We use the notation FRRTEw to denote FRR
Choosing appropriate weak classifiers is a significant
under TEW .

consideration in AdaBoost. The most commonly used

weak learning methods for implementing AdaBoost- 65
based classifiers are decision stumps (also called one
node tree ) and decision trees .

Equal error rate (EER ): This is the point where FAR
equals FRR . Reporting only FRR or FAR does not
provide the complete picture because there is a trade

off between the two since we can make one of them low
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for all Adaboost-based classifiers since we determined

ever, in a continuous authentication scenario , the sec
ond sequence would be considered worse since the

TABLE IV

15

mainly use EER (instead of FRR or FAR ) for reporting experimentally that the training error becomes zero within
CABA's accuracy. As before, we use the notation these many iterations and testing error becomes minimum .
The value of EER = 7 h is reported in Table IV for all
EER = TEW to denote EER under TEW .
False acceptance worst -case interval ( FAW ): The output 5 classifiers . AdaBoost with a tree size of 15 ( i.e., with 15
of the authentication system in a time period T is a nodes in the tree ) has the minimum value of EER t= 7 h
sequence of accept/ reject decisions . As an example , Increasing tree size usually improves the accuracy of Ada
FIG . 6 shows two possible output sequences over a boost -based classifiers . However, using larger trees leads to
ten -minute authentication timeframe when an impostor more complex models , which are more susceptible to over
is trying to get authenticated . In both sequences, the 10
. This can be seen when wemove from a tree size of
number of falsely accepted requests is the same. How 15fitting
to 20 .

impostor can use the system over a four-minute time

frame without being detected , whereas in the first case 15
the impostor can only use the system over a one-minute
timeframe. We define FAW as the longest time interval
(expressed in minutes for CABA ) over which an
impostor can be falsely accepted as a legitimate user. In
the example of FIG . 6 , FAW is one minute and four 20

minutes for the first and second cases , respectively .
False rejection worst -case interval ( FRW ): Analogously
to FAW , we define FRW as the longest time interval ( ex
pressed in minutes ) over which a legitimate user might be
25
falsely rejected and marked as an impostor.
Scalability Metrics
In order to analyze the scalability of the proposed method ,
we consider two metrics: time complexity and space com
plexity , using the well-known O notation. We express them

Type of classifier
SVM

AdaBoost

Specification
Kernel

EER - 7 h ( % )
3.0

Linear

Kernel RBF

2.6

Tree size = 1
Tree size = 5
Tree size 10
Tree size 15
Tree size 20

3.1
2.9
2.9

2.4
2.5

Table V summarizes FAW and FRW for all classification

as a function of the number N of the people in the dataset. 30 minutes
schemes,.which
Consider
RBF SVM as an example. Its FAW is 4
suggests that, in the worst case , an impostor
Evaluating the CABA Prototype
In this section, we evaluate CABA from both the accuracy
Authentication Accuracy
In order to examine the accuracy of the authentication 35

and scalability perspectives .

can deceive the authentication system for a 4 -minute time
frame. Its FRW is 3 minutes, which suggests that, in the
worst case, a legitimate user is falsely rejected for a stretch
of 3 minutes .

system , we have implemented a prototype of CABA in
Matlab .
The accuracy ofa model is generally evaluated using a set
of data points that is different from the set used in construct Type of classifier
ing the model. Thus, in order to train and test a model , the 40 SVM
dataset can be divided into two parts : training and test sets .
Cross- validation is often used for this purpose. The classical
K - fold cross - validation refers to the case in which the
dataset is divided into K folds (K - 1 folds for training and
one fold for testing ), under the assumption that potential 45
dependencies across observations are time-independent.
However, K - fold cross -validation cannot be used to estimate
the performance of a system that processes a time series (i.e.,
a sequence of data points consisting of successive measure
ments ) because potential local dependencies across obser- 50
vations in a time series define a structure in the data that will
be ignored by cross-validation . Thus, as disclosed herein ,
instead of using traditional cross- validation , we have
designed several experimental scenarios for evaluating the
accuracy of the authentication system . We describe these 55
scenarios next.

1. Baseline :

AdaBoost

TABLE V
Specification
F AW (min ) F RW (min )
Kernel Linear
Kernel RBF

Tree size = 1
Tree size 5
Tree size = 10
Tree size = 15
Tree size = 20

4
4
5

3

4

3
3

4.
4
4

3
4

2. Biased FARG/FRR ,
Even though it is easier to compare authentication meth
ods based on their EER , we may want to minimize FAR , in
highly -secure environments in order to ensure that an impos

tor is not authorized or minimize FRR , to enhance user
convenience . A low FAR , indicates a high security level and
a low FRR , ensures user convenience . In this experimental
scenario , we use the same parameters that are used in the
baseline. However, false acceptance and false rejection are

penalized differently. We consider two cases : (i) try to make
half of the dataset (the first seven hours) of each individual 60 (ii ) try to make FRR , close to zero (FRRE7 h <0.1% ) and
In the baseline scenario , we break the available dataset

into two equal parts ( i.e. , TEW = TRW = 7 h ). We use the first

FAR , close to zero (FAR = 7 n < 0.1 % ) and measure FRR , and

to train the model and the second half to test it. We use all

measure FAR ,. Tables W and VII summarize the results for

the Biostreams ( i.e., n = 9 ) to train and test our system . We these two cases . Based on Table VI, the CABA system can
use two classification methods: SVM and AdaBoost. In the be seen to ensure impostors are not accepted , but at the cost
case of SVM , we use two kernels [ linear and radial basis of an increase in FRR . Based on Table VII, the CABA
function (RBF)]. In the case of AdaBoost, we consider 65 system can be seen to not negatively impact user conve
decision stumps (one-node tree) and decision trees with 5 , nience ( i.e., not falsely reject the user ), while rejecting
10 , 15 , and 20 nodes as weak classifiers. We run 40 iterations impostors in more than 90 % of the cases.
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Type of classifier

TABLE VI
Specification

SVM

Kernel = Linear

AdaBoost

Kernel = RBF
Tree size = 1

Tree size

Tree size

F RR ( % )
10.2
9.6
10.0
9.7

5
=

Tree size

8.7

10
15

8.4
8.9

Tree size = 20

TABLE VII

Type of classifier

Specification

SVM

Kernel Linear
Kernel = RBF
Tree size
Tree size 5
Tree size 15
Tree size 15
Tree size = 20

AdaBoost

F AR ( % )
8.9
7.6
10.7

9.2

=

7.8

7.6
8.2

that the required time for processing an authentication
request for N = 37 was on the order of a few milliseconds for
all classification methods, when CABA was implemented on
a MacBook Pro (2.3 GHz Intel Core i7 processor with 8 GB
5 memory ). This suggests that CABA can re -authenticate the
user very quickly .
When a person requests authentication by providing his
ID and feature vector Y, the Look -up stage forwards Y to one
and only one classifier in the Jury stage based on the given
10 user ID . Then , the classifier's decision is the final decision
of the authentication system . Hence , in order to analyze the
time complexity of a single decision making process , we
need to consider the time complexity of the Look -up stage ,
and one classifier in the Jury stage , as follows:
15
Look -up stage: If the Look -up stage is implemented using
a hash table that associates user IDs with pointers to
classifiers, then its search operation (finding the loca
tion of the classifier associated with the user ID ) can be
performed in O ( 1) time.
20
One classifier in the Jury stage : The time complexity of
the classifier varies from one classification algorithm to

3. Variable Window Size :

As mentioned earlier, we set the training and testing
window sizes to 7 h in the baseline. Here , we change the size 25
of the training and testing windows such that TRW = 2 ,

another. The time complexities of AdaBoost classifiers
depend on N ( i.e., they have time complexity of O ( 1 )).
The time complexity of SVM with an RBF kernel is
and the SVM classifier with a linear kernel do not

O (nsv ), where nsy is the number of support vectors .
Theoretically, nsy grows linearly with a linear increase
in N. Thus, the SVM classifier with an RBF kernel has
a time complexity of O (N ) .
decreases drastically , then it remains almost constant until 30 Hence, the overall time complexity of decision making is
TRW reaches 11 h . Above this TRW , EER starts increasing just O ( 1) for AdaBoost classifiers and the SVM classifier
for two possible reasons . First, the model may become with a linear kernel, and O (N ) for the SVM classifier with
overfitted . Second , the number of test points may be inad
an RBF kernel.
Space Complexity
equate .
35
We first examine how much memory is required for
4. Moving Training Window :
In this scenario , the training window moves behind the storing the authentication system . Then , we discuss how the
testing window (FIG . 8 ). We consider TEW = TRW = 1, amountofmemory required to store the two stages (Look -up
2 , ... , 7 h . Our experimental results demonstrate that this and Jury ) increases with N.
verification scheme provides the best result for
The amount of memory required for storing the Look -up
TEW = TRW = 4 h , for which the average EER , is 1.9 % and 40 stage in our prototype, where N = 37 , was less than 1 kB . The
the classification method is AdaBoost with a tree size of 15 amountofmemory required for storing a single classifier in
nodes. This suggests that we can achieve the best accuracy the Jury stage varies from tens of bytes ( for SVM with a
for TRW = 4 h , under the assumption that the trained model linear kernel) to a few kB (for AdaBoost with a tree size of
is valid for the next four hours .
20 ). Therefore , the total amount ofmemory allocated to the
5. Reducing the Number of Biostreams:
45 authentication system is less than 1 MB .
We also examine what happens if we drop a Biostream .
Thus, we examine the space complexity as a function of
N.
Traditionally, feature reduction is used to remove redundant
or irrelevant features from the data set before commencing
Look - up stage: If the Look -up stage is implemented using
on the training process in order to decrease unnecessary
a hash table, its space complexity is O (N ).
computational cost . However , in our scenario , the main 50 Jury stage : The space complexity of a single classifier in
purpose of feature reduction is to examine how each feature
the Jury stage depends on the type of classifier . The
space complexities of AdaBoost classifiers and the
affects accuracy. If CABA can provide an acceptable accu
racy (target accuracy level) with fewer features , fewer
SVM classifier with a linear kernel do not depend on N
WMSs would be required . We dropped one feature at a time
( i.e. , they have space complexity of O ( 1 )). However,
and computed EER t = 7 h of the system . All other configura- 55
the space complexity of the SVM with an RBF kernel
tions are kept the same as in the baseline . FIG . 9 illustrates
is O (N ). Since the number of classifiers in the Jury
how EER 7 h changes when we drop different Biostreams.
stage increases linearly with N , its space complexity is
It indicates that themost and least important Biostreams are
O ( N ) (when an AdaBoost classifier or SVM classifier
respiratory rate and body temperature, respectively.
with a linear kernel is used ) or O (N2) (when the SVM
60
classifier with the RBF kernel is employed ).
CABA Scalability
We discuss below the worst- case time and space com
To sum up , the space complexity of the authentication
system is either O (N ) ( for AdaBoost classifiers and the SVM
plexities of CABA .
3 , ..., 12 h and TEW + TRW = 14 h . FIG . 7 shows the average
EER , for different classifiers with respect to TRW . For all
classifiers, as we increase TRW from 2 h to 6 h , EER ,

t

Time Complexity

classifier with a linear kernel ) or O (N2) (for the SVM
As discussed earlier, CABA can be implemented in such classifier with the RBF kernel)
a manner that the time required by the learning phase is 65 Supporting Identification in the CABA System
hidden from the user's perspective . Hence , we focus on the
The majority of continuous authentication systems only
time complexity of the decision making process. We found support continuous verification in which the user provides a
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user ID and the system checks if the user is the person he
purports to be. In this section, we describe how CABA can
be modified to also identify the user from a database of users
by processing feature vector Y provided by the smartphone.

much we trust a user based on previous decisions of the
continuous authentication system . TRL has a value between
0 and 100 , where a higher number indicates a higher level
of trust. The initial value of TRL is 100 when the user is

A continuous authentication system that also supports iden- 5 authenticated and authorized for the first time. The value of
tification works as follows. When a legitimate user sends his TRL is continuously updated using a trust update procedure
first request to the system , the system first identifies the user after each decision making step . A simple trust update
and outputs a user ID . Then , the system assumes that the procedure may be to just increase (decrease ) the TRL by a
current user is the one who has been identified and continu
ously verifies the user identity. FIG . 10 is a block diagram 10 constant step after each accept (reject) decision . Trust update

procedure shows the pseudo -code for such an approach . We
need to set two parameters : W Accept and W Reject The values
W Accept and W Reject should be chosen such that the TRL
value
becomes 0 as soon as we detect the presence of an
of data points that are collected from the user's Bio Aura . impostor
and becomes 100 when we confidently verify that
Then
,
it
transmits
the
preprocessed
data
(
Y
)
to
the
authen15
the
user
is
legitimate. ConsiderAdaBoost classification with
tication system .
a
tree
size
of
15 nodes that yields FRW = 3 . This indicates that
2. Unlike the verification scenario , in which Y is sent to the authentication
system may falsely reject three consecu
only one classifier, in the identification scenario , the Dis tive requests of a legitimate
user in the worst case. There
patch stage forwards Y to all classifiers in the Jury stage .
fore, if the RAA scheme gets at least four consecutive reject
3. All classifiers process Y simultaneously , and output N 20 decisions from the authentication system , it becomes con
binary decisions.
fident that the user is an impostor ( TRL = 0 ). Hence , we can
4. The decisions of all classifiers in the Jury stage are sent set
W Reject for this classifier as follows:
to the Foreman stage . The Foreman stage either indicates
that the user is not in the database, or concludes that he is ,
in which case it returns his user ID . This stage can be 25
-100
-100
W Reject FRW + 1 4 -25 .
implemented in different ways. For example , the Foreman
Algorithm shows a simple pseudo -code for this stage . The
algorithm receives all outputs from the Jury stage and
outputs the user ID if there is only one classifier whose FAW = 4 for the above -mentioned classification method ,
output is an accept decision. Otherwise, it indicates no 30 which
indicates that in the worst case, an impostor may be
falsely accepted as a legitimate user in four successive trials .
match .
Therefore , if the authentication system outputs five consecu
Real- Time Adaptive Authorization
tive
accent decisions. TRL should become 100. Thus,we can
In this section , we first define the concept of authoriza
tion . Then , we propose a real-time adaptive authorization set w Accept as follows:
(RAA ) scheme, which uses the decisions from CABA to 35
provide an extremely flexible access control model . The
+100
+100
RAA concept is not limited to CABA . It provides an
= +20 .
Waccept FAW
5
+
adjustable access control model for any authorization system
showing how a CABA system can identify a user. Each
identification scenario includes several steps :
1. The smartphone preprocesses a one-minute timeframe

that authorizes the user based on decisions of a continuous

authentication system .

40

Authorization is defined as the process of establishing if
the user, who is already authenticated , is allowed access to
a resource, system , or area .
Traditional authorization schemes grant a specific access
level to the authenticated user based on his user ID . How- 45

ever, the fact that continuous authentication mechanisms
have a non- zero FRR implies that such a simple scheme may
unintentionally block a legitimate access when the authen
tication system fails to recognize a valid user for a short
period of time. Consider a scenario in which a continuous 50
authentication system is used to protect a personal laptop
from unauthorized users . The authentication system first
authenticates the user. Then , the authorization scheme speci
fies the user's access level based on the user ID . However,
the laptop may log out the user when the authentication 55
scheme falsely rejects him . RAA schemes can be used to
alleviate user inconvenience caused by false reject deci
sions. They continuously adjust the user's access level based
on the last decision of the authentication system . Next, we
propose a RAA scheme that can be used with a continuous 60
authentication system . A Foreman Algorithm is disclosed in
U.S. provisional application 62/291,877 , filed Feb. 5, 2016 ,
which is incorporated herein in its entirety .

We can set different threshold values for different appli

cations. For example, we can set the threshold value to 100
for accessing email and financial accounts to ensure that the
user can access such accounts only when the system is
confident that the user is legitimate . However, for less
sensitive applications (e.g., simple web surfing ), a lower

level of trust might be sufficient. A Trust update procedure
is also disclosed in U.S. provisional application 62/291,877,
filed Feb. 5 , 2016 , which is incorporated herein in its
entirety .
Potential Threats and Countermeasures
In this section , webriefly describe possible attacks against
CABA and potential security threats that can be exploited by
attackers to bypass CABA . For each attack , we also suggest
possible countermeasures .

1. Eavesdropping: This is defined as the act of covertly
listening to confidential conversation of others,which , in our
context, can be done by intercepting the communication
between two devices using appropriate equipment (e.g.,
HackRF ). Eavesdropping can occur when unencrypted
information is transmitted over an untrusted channel.
Countermeasures : The most effective and well-known
defense against eavesdropping is encryption . For example,
the transmitted message can be encrypted using Advanced
Trust Level -Based RAA
Encryption Standard (AESBOOK ]. However , implementing
A trust level-based RAA adaptively changes the user's 65 a strong encryption in WMSs may not be possible in the
access level based on a parameter called trust level (TRL ). current state of the technology since they have limited
TRL is a recently -suggested parameter that represents how energy and memory capacity. Fortunately , eavesdropping
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does not pose a direct threat to the authentication system . In
other words, it is possible to design the authentication
system assuming that eavesdropping does occur on the
communication between the WMSs and the smartphone . In
this case , CABA would require that the data be sent from a
smartphone that is previously registered in the system to
ensure that the attacker is not able to capture the medical
information and send the captured information to CABA
using another smartphone . The smartphone can send its

check if the message is created by a legitimate sender.
The WMSs and the smartphone can digitally sign the

biomedical information before transmitting it .
5

Further disclosure is contained in U.S. provisional appli
cation 62 /291,877, filed Feb. 5 , 2016 , which is incorporated
herein in its entirety. All references that are cited in the
appendix ofU.S. provisional application 62 /291,877 and the
references section of the appendix are also incorporated

unique ID over a secure communication link to CABA 10 herein in their entirety. It should be understood that many
variations are possible based on the disclosure herein .
before transmitting the biomedical information .
Although features and elements are described above in
2.
Phishing
:
This
is
an
attack
that
attempts
to
fool
the
user
into submitting his confidential or private information (e.g., particular combinations, each feature or element can be used

username, password , email address , and phone number) to

alone without the other features and elements or in various

an untrusted server or device. A potential phishing attack 15 combinations with or without other features and elements.
against CABA may be launched as follows. The attacker The digital processing techniques disclosed herein may be

might attempt to fool the user's smartphone by sending a partially implemented in a computer program , software , or
counterfeit request that asks the smartphone to send its firmware incorporated in a computer- readable (non -transi
authentication - related information to the attacker's server.
tory ) storage medium for execution by a general- purpose
Countermeasures: The most effective way to address 20 computer or a processor. Examples of computer -readable
phishing attacks is to use a digital certificate ( i.e., an storage mediums include a read only memory (ROM ), a
electronic document that allows a device to exchange infor random access memory (RAM ), a register , cache memory ,
mation securely using the public key infrastructure ). The semiconductor
memory devices, magnetic media such as
certificate carries information about the key and its owner . In internal hard disks and removable disks, magneto - optical
CABA
, the server's
digitalthatcertificate
canthat
be examined
by 25 media , and optical media such as CD -ROM disks, and
the
smartphone
to ensure
the server
asks for the
digital versatile disks (DVDs).
information is the trusted server.
3. Replay attack : In a replay attack , an attacker records the
data, packets , and user's credentials, which are transmitted
between two devices ( e.g., a WMS and the smartphone), and 30
exploits them for a malicious purpose. In a replay attack
against the authentication system , the attacker attempts to
impersonate a legitimate user in order to bypass the authen
tication procedure and gain full access to the protected
device
, application
or areaattack
. Unlike
the attacks
on 35
eavesdropping
, in a ,replay
, the attacker
doesbased
not need
to interpret the packets . In fact, he can even record encrypted
packets and retransmit them in order to bypass the system .
Countermeasures: An encrypted timestamp ( i.e., a
sequence of encrypted information identifying when the 40
transmission occurred ) can be utilized to enable the authen
tication system to check that the packets were not previously
recorded . Moreover , the packet should include a field that
contains the encrypted information (e.g., a hashed device
ID ), which can be used in the authentication system to 45
uniquely specify the sender of the packets and check if the
sender is known and trusted .
4. Poisoning attack : In a poisoning attack , the attacker
changes the final learning model by adding precisely - se
lected invalid data points to the training dataset. In CABA , 50
the attacker might threaten the integrity of the machine
learning algorithm by using an untrusted WMS that aims to
add malicious data points to the training set.
Countermeasures: We describe two main types of coun
55
termeasures against poisoning attacks.
Outlier detection : One of the common goals of defenses
against poisoning attacks is to reduce the effect of
invalid data points on the final result. In a machine
learning method , such invalid data points are consid
ered outliers in the training dataset. Mozaffari-Kermani 60
et al. have presented and evaluated several counter
measures against poisoning attacks.
Digitally -signed medical information : A digital signature
can be used to check the authenticity of the informa
tion . A digital signature is a mathematicalmethod for 65
demonstrating the authenticity of a transmitted mes
sage . Thus, it provides the means to the recipient to

Suitable processors include, by way of example, a gen
eral-purpose processor, a special purpose processor, a con
ventional processor, a digital signal processor (DSP ), a
plurality ofmicroprocessors, one or more microprocessors
in association with a DSP core , a controller , a microcon
troller, Application -Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs),
Field -Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) circuits, any

other type of integrated circuit (IC ), and / or a state machine .
What is claimed is :

1. A system for continuous authentication of a user of an

electronic device for use with a plurality of wireless wear

able medical sensors (WMSs ) and a wireless base station
configured to receive a biomedical data stream (biostream )
from each of the plurality of WMSs, the biostream from a

single WMS lacking enough discriminatory power to dis
tinguish the user, the system comprising:
a Bio Aura engine located on a server, the server having
one or more receive buffers configured to store a
preprocessed plurality of biostreams, the BioAura
engine being configured to :

transmit the preprocessed plurality of biostreams to a
classifier particular to a user of the electronic device
via a look up stage ; and

generate an authentication output to authenticate the
user's access to the electronic device based on
whether the preprocessed plurality of biostreams
matches a trained model of the user's plurality of
biostreams via the classifier particular to the user, the
trained model based on an initial training dataset
comprising multi -dimensional data points containing
average values of successive measurements of the
retrieved biostreams over a specified time interval ,

the trained model being periodically updated with
subsequent training datasets each comprising multi
dimensional data points containing average values of

successive measurements of the retrieved biostreams

over a specified time interval;
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the wireless base station having a communication engine

trained model based on an initial training dataset

configured to :
retrieve the biostream from each WMS ;

comprising multi-dimensional data points containing

preprocess the retrieved biostreams by creating a multi
dimensional data point containing average values of 5
the retrieved biostreams over a specified time inter

average values of successive measurements of the

retrieved biostreams over a specified time interval,
the trained model being periodically updated with

val; and

subsequent training datasets each comprising multi
dimensional data points containing average values of

server.

over a specified time interval;

transmit the preprocessed plurality ofbiostreams to the

successive measurements of the retrieved biostreams

2. The system of claim 1 wherein the retrieved biostreams 10
comprise at least two of the following biostreams: Arterial
systolic blood pressure (ABPSYS ), Arterial diastolic blood
pressure (ABPDIAS), Arterial average blood pressure
(ABPMEAN ), Heart rate (HR ), Pulmonary systolic artery
pressure (PAPSYS), Pulmonary diastolic artery pressure 15
(PAPDIAS), Body temperature ( T ), Oxygen saturation
(SPO2 ), and Respiratory rate (RESP ) .
3. The system of claim 1 wherein the retrieved biostreams
comprise at least three of the following biostreams: Arterial
systolic blood pressure ( ABPSYS ), Arterial diastolic blood 20
pressure (ABPDIAS ), Arterial average blood pressure
( ABPMEAN ), Heart rate (HR ), Pulmonary systolic artery
pressure (PAPSYS ), Pulmonary diastolic artery pressure
(PAPDIAS), Body temperature ( T ), Oxygen saturation

the wireless base station having a communication engine
configured to :
retrieve the biostream from each WMS ;

preprocess the retrieved biostreamsby creating a multi
dimensional data point containing average values of
the retrieved biostreams over a specified time inter
val; and

transmit the preprocessed plurality of biostreams to the
computing device.
12. The system of claim 11 wherein the retrieved bio

streams comprise at least two of the following biostreams:
Arterial systolic blood pressure (ABPSYS ), Arterial dia
stolic blood pressure (ABPDIAS), Arterial average blood
pressure (ABPMEAN ), Heart rate (HR ), Pulmonary systolic
artery pressure (PAPSYS ), Pulmonary diastolic artery pres
sure (PAPDIAS), Body temperature (T ), Oxygen saturation

25
(SPO2), and Respiratory rate (RESP ).
4. The system of claim 1 wherein the retrieved biostreams
comprise the following biostreams: Arterial systolic blood
pressure (ABPSYS ), Arterialdiastolic blood pressure (ABP (SPO2), and Respiratory rate (RESP ).
DIAS ), Arterial average blood pressure (ABPMEAN ), Heart
13. The system of claim 11 wherein the retrieved bio

rate (HR ), Pulmonary systolic artery pressure (PAPSYS ), 30
Pulmonary diastolic artery pressure ( PAPDIAS), Body tem
perature ( T), Oxygen saturation (SPO2), and Respiratory
rate (RESP ).
5. The system of claim 1 wherein the retrieved biostreams
35
are selected based on a target accuracy level.
6. The system of claim 1 wherein the BioAura engine is
operated continuously, generating the authentication output
on a periodic or an a - periodic basis.
7. The system of claim 1 wherein preprocessing the
retrieved
biostreamsreduces the bandwidth needed to trans- 40
mit the preprocessed plurality of biostreams to the server .
8. The system of claim 1 wherein the wireless base station
is a smartphone.
9. The system of claim 1 wherein the electronic device is

at least one of a tablet and a smart lock .

10. The system of claim 1 wherein the classifier is

45

streams comprise at least three of the following biostreams:
Arterial systolic blood pressure (ABPSYS ), Arterial dia
stolic blood pressure (ABPDIAS), Arterial average blood
pressure (ABPMEAN ), Heart rate (HR ), Pulmonary systolic
artery pressure (PAPSYS), Pulmonary diastolic artery pres
sure (PAPDIAS ), Body temperature (T ), Oxygen saturation
(SPO2), and Respiratory rate (RESP ).
14. The system of claim 11 wherein the retrieved bio

streams comprise the following biostreams: Arterial systolic
blood pressure (ABPSYS ), Arterial diastolic blood pressure
(ABPDIAS),Arterial average blood pressure (ABPMEAN ),
Heart rate (HR ), Pulmonary systolic artery pressure (PAP
SYS ), Pulmonary diastolic artery pressure (PAPDIAS),
Body temperature ( T), Oxygen saturation (SPO2), and
Respiratory rate (RESP ).
15. The system of claim 11 wherein the retrieved bio

implemented using one of Support Vector Machine (SVM ) streams are selected based on a target accuracy level.
16. The system of claim 11 wherein preprocessing the
and Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost ).
retrieved
biostreams reduces the bandwidth needed to trans
11. A system for continuous authentication of a user of a
computing device for use with a plurality of wireless wear- 50 mit the preprocessed plurality of biostreams to the comput
able medical sensors (WMSs) and a wireless base station ing device.
configured to receive a biomedical data stream (biostream )
from each of the plurality of WMSs, the biostream from a

17. The system of claim 11 wherein the computing device
is a personal computer.
single WMS lacking enough discriminatory power to dis
18. The system of claim 11 wherein the BioAura engine
55
tinguish the user , the system comprising:
is
operated
continuously , generating the authentication out
a BioAura engine located on the computing device , the put on a periodic
or an a -periodic basis .
computing device having one or more receive buffers
configured to store a plurality of biostreams, the Bio
19. The system of claim 11 wherein the classifier is
implemented using one of Support Vector Machine (SVM )
Aura engine being configured to :
transmit the preprocessed plurality of biostreams to a 60 and Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost ).
classifier particular to a user of the computing device
20. A system for continuous authentication of a user of an
via a look up stage ; and
electronic device for use with a plurality of wireless wear
generate an authentication output to authenticate the able medical sensors (WMSs) and a wireless base station
user's access to the computing device based on configured to receive a biomedical data stream (biostream )
whether the preprocessed plurality of biostreams 65 from each of the plurality of WMSs, the biostream from a
matches a trained model of the user's plurality of single WMS lacking enough discriminatory power to dis
biostreams via the classifier particular to the user, the tinguish the user, the system comprising:
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a BioAura engine located on a server, the BioAura engine
being configured to :
retrieve the biostreams from the wireless base station ;
preprocess the retrieved biostreamsby creating a multi
dimensional data point containing average values of 5
the retrieved biostreams over a specified time inter
val;

transmit the preprocessed plurality of biostreams to a

classifier particular to a user of the electronic device

via a look up stage ; and

10

generate an authentication output to authenticate the
user's access to the electronic device based on

whether the preprocessed plurality of biostreams

matches a trained model of the user's plurality of
biostreams via the classifier particular to the user, the 15
trained model based on an initial training dataset
comprising multi-dimensional data points containing
average values of successive measurements of the
retrieved biostreams over a specified time interval,

the trained model being periodically updated with 20
subsequent training datasets each comprising multi
dimensional data points containing average values of
successivemeasurements of the retrieved biostreams

over a specified time interval.

25

